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COUNTING OFFENSES
JEFFREY M. CHEMERINSKY†
ABSTRACT
Is a criminal defendant who discharges a weapon five times in
rapid succession guilty of one crime or several crimes? This question
of how to divide charges has vexed legal philosophers and Supreme
Court Justices. It is a question of profound importance, but one that
legal scholarship has seldom addressed. The answer has an impact on
each stage of a criminal justice prosecution. The difference between
one charge and multiple charges can affect the likelihood of a plea
bargain, the strategy for trial, and, if the defendant is convicted, the
length of a prison sentence. This Note, citing numerous examples of
these cases, shows that the decision to charge a defendant with
multiple offenses is often arbitrary and inconsistent. This Note first
categorizes the overlapping and confusing methods courts use in
determining the number of offenses to allow. This Note then describes
the implications of these decisions and why their inconsistencies
undermine principles of fairness in some criminal justice trials.
Finally, this Note proposes that courts should apply three existing
legal doctrines when making these choices to promote fairer and more
consistent decisions.

INTRODUCTION
Does a person who punches another person four times commit
one crime or four? Does it matter if seconds, minutes, or hours
separated the offensive contacts or if they took place in the same
location or different locations? Should a man who forcibly penetrates
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a woman three times be charged with one count of rape or three? Is a
person who fires six shots at a patrol car guilty of one act of wanton
endangerment or six? What standards should guide these
determinations? As Chief Justice Warren acknowledged in a case
addressing how to divide drug charges, “[t]he problem of multiple
1
punishment is a vexing and recurring one.”
Although this issue arises frequently, few scholars have devoted
2
attention to it. The law is unclear in this area, forcing prosecutors to
determine on a case-by-case basis whether to charge a series of
unlawful actions as a single, continuing course of conduct or as
multiple separate offenses. How a prosecutor charges the unlawful
conduct affects each stage of a criminal prosecution, from plea
bargaining through sentencing. Charging a defendant with multiple
counts can enhance the pressure to plead guilty and may unduly
influence the offense to which a defendant pleads. Whether a
defendant is convicted of one count or three counts can dramatically
affect the sentence, both in terms of the statutory maximum and in
terms of enhanced penalties under repeat-offender statutes.
Widespread variation among prosecutions charging the same conduct
as one or multiple offenses raises issues of fundamental fairness.
This Note discusses how courts determine whether to treat a
course of unlawful conduct as a single crime or as multiple criminal
acts, presents problems with the existing approaches, and proposes a
solution for courts addressing this problem in the future. Part I
categorizes relevant cases and outlines the four different tests courts
use to determine whether a defendant’s actions constitute a single
offense or multiple offenses. Part II discusses how this charging
discretion, unbounded by any clear rules, may undermine the fairness
of criminal trials. Part III suggests using three established legal

1. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting).
2. Scholars have addressed a related but distinct subject of when a single act can lead to
multiple offenses under different statutory provisions, as, for example, when an illegal entry into
a home can be charged both as a trespass and a burglary. See, e.g., Kyden Creekpaum, Note,
What’s Wrong with a Little More Double Jeopardy? A 21st Century Recalibration of an Ancient
Individual Right, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1179, 1185 (2007) (“With a few sensible exceptions, a
convicted person cannot be re-prosecuted for any lesser⎯or greater⎯included offenses. The
general rule protects individuals from multiple government prosecutions on substantially similar
issues that would allow the government to . . . obtain additional punishment for conduct that has
been already, if only partially, punished.” (footnote omitted)). This Note addresses whether the
same incident could be charged as multiple offenses under the same statute, for example, as if
the defendant went in and out of the window several times carrying multiple loads of stolen
property.
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doctrines to address significant problems of fairness and justice: First,
courts should adhere to the rule of lenity and presume that—in cases
of ambiguity—crimes are single offenses unless the legislature clearly
indicates otherwise. Second, in cases in which multiple charges for a
single occurrence are deemed appropriate, courts should ensure that
the resulting sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Third, and finally,
multiple offenses from the same conduct should not trigger habitual
offender statutes. Courts applying these doctrines will ultimately
reach more consistent and fair results.
These tests will not provide courts with perfect answers on how
many charges are appropriate. Such tests do not and cannot exist. The
application of these three tests will, however, substantially alleviate
the harms caused by the ambiguity in how to charge and punish these
crimes.
I. ONE CRIME OR MANY CRIMES?: COURTS’ INCONSISTENT AND
UNSATISFYING APPROACHES
Describing the legal rule for when a particular act should be
charged as one or multiple offenses proves difficult because the courts
have not consistently approached this issue. Courts have employed
four approaches for determining the unit of prosecution:
(1) examining legislative intent, (2) looking to criminal impulse,
(3) applying an “act”-based approach, and (4) analyzing the crime
based on time units. These approaches overlap significantly, and few
cases fit nicely in a single box—a court may consider the legislative
intent behind the statute, and, additionally, try to determine if the
conduct was motivated by separate impulses. Nonetheless it is useful
to consider the four main methods courts employ.
A. A Legislative Intent–Based Approach
1. The Legislative-Intent Approach Defined. In the vast majority
3
of cases, the statute does not specify the unit of prosecution. Without
3. In some rare instances, the legislature specifically lays out the unit of prosecution.
These statutes are not the topic of this Note. When the legislature spells out the unit of
prosecution, the answer is settled; this Note addresses ambiguous cases that force courts to
resolve whether the defendant is appropriately charged with one crime or several. For example,
in Byrd v. State, 162 S.W. 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913), the court applied a statute that made each
day of practicing medicine without a license its own crime, id. at 363. Byrd was prosecuted for
two counts of this offense for practicing on two days, and the court upheld the conviction,
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an explicit statutory provision, courts often infer the desired unit from
other sources, including the findings of the legislature that passed the
statute and individual legislators’ statements in enacting the statute.
As one court acknowledged, “[t]he unit of prosecution of a statutory
offense is generally a question of what the legislature intended to be
the act or course of conduct prohibited by the statute for purposes of
4
a single conviction and sentence.”
The Supreme Court endorsed this approach in the first case
considering the appropriate unit of prosecution for multiple acts. In
5
the case of In re Snow, the Supreme Court considered whether
defendant Lorenzo Snow could be prosecuted for multiple counts of
unlawful cohabitation when he continuously lived with seven women
6
over a thirty-five month period. Snow was charged with violating a
federal law that prohibited any male from residing with more than
one woman. Each violation of the statute was punishable by six
7
months in prison and a $300 fine. The trial court split Snow’s illegal
conduct into three offenses, each comprising around one year, and
Snow was convicted of three counts of illegal cohabitation for the
8
thirty-five-month-long cohabitation. Later, Snow filed a writ of
habeas corpus to overturn his conviction and reduce his sentence,
9
claiming his actions constituted a single, continuous violation.
The Supreme Court overturned two of Snow’s three separate
convictions, holding that, based on the legislative intent of the statute,
10
Snow committed a single offense. In support of its reasoning in

finding that “[n]either [charge] is a bar to the other, and the conviction in the other does not put
him in jeopardy in this—they are not the same offenses, but entirely separate and distinct
offenses.” Id. The Byrd case is an example of a statute that simply asks courts to apply a defined
unit of prosecution.
4. Brown v. State, 535 A.2d 485, 489 (Md. 1988).
5. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
6. Id. at 276, 282.
7. Id. at 281–82. The Court explained,
The offence of cohabiting with more than one woman, in the sense of
the . . . statute . . . may be committed by a man by living in the same house with two
women whom he had theretofore acknowledged as his wives, and eating at their
respective tables, and holding them out to the world by his language or conduct, or
both, as his wives, though he may not occupy the same bed or sleep in the same room
with them, or either of them, or have sexual intercourse with either of them.
Id. at 281.
8. Id. at 277.
9. Id. at 279–80.
10. Id. at 282.
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Snow, the Supreme Court relied on a British case, Crepps v.
12
Durden, which involved the violation of a statute dictating “that no
tradesman or other person shall do or exercise any worldly labour,
business, or work of their ordinary calling on the Lord’s Day, works
of necessity or charity only excepted” and prescribed a penalty of five
13
shillings for violating the law. In Crepps, the defendant was initially
charged with—and convicted of—four violations of the statute for
14
“selling [four] small hot loaves of bread” on a single Sunday. Upon
review, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, finding
that the defendant could only be charged with one offense and not
15
four. The court reasoned that by enacting the statute, Parliament
intended to punish working on Sundays, and, thus, it should not
16
matter whether the person worked for days, hours, or minutes. The
court inferred that “the object which the legislature had in view in
making the statute . . . was to punish a man for exercising his ordinary
17
trade and calling on a Sunday.” Thus, the court determined that
18
there “can be but one entire offence on one and the same day” and
that even if the defendant “had continued baking from morning till
19
night, it would still be but one offence.” The court ruled that
whether a defendant is charged with multiple offenses “does not turn
upon niceties; upon a computation how many hours distant the
several bakings happened . . . but it goes upon the ground that the
20
offence itself can be committed only once in the same day.”
In embracing the principles of Crepps, “th[e] Court [in Snow]
expressly adopted the reasoning of Crepps that the proper unit of
prosecution was completely dependent upon the legislature’s
21
intent.” Since Snow, numerous courts, including the Supreme Court,

11. Id. at 283 (citing Crepps v. Durden, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B.)).
12. Crepps v. Durden, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B.).
13. In re Snow, 120 U.S. at 283 (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1285).
14. Id. (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1284).
15. Id. at 284 (citing Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1287).
16. Id. (citing Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1287).
17. Id. (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1287).
18. Id. (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1287).
19. Id. (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1285).
20. Id. at 285 (quoting Crepps, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1287).
21. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 704 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The court
in Williams v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 491 (Ky. 2005), came to a similar conclusion, id. at
495. The court found that “[t]he singular form of ‘photograph,’ read in conjunction with the
term ‘any,’ clearly indicates that the Legislature intended prosecution for each differing
photograph.” Id. Thus separate counts were appropriate when the defendant shot multiple
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have tried to ascertain whether an act constituted one or multiple
counts by considering the legislative intent behind the criminal
22
statute. In Ebeling v. Morgan, for example, the Supreme Court
considered whether the defendant should be charged with one
offense or separate offenses for unlawfully tearing into successive
23
mailbags with the intent to steal the mail. Assessing whether the
defendant could be charged with a separate count for each bag, the
Court first turned to the language of the statute and the intent of the
24
drafters. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent was clear:
“Congress evidently intended to protect the mail in each sack, and to
make an attack thereon in the manner described a distinct and
25
separate offense.” After reviewing the legislative history of the
statute, the Court held that the words of the statute “plainly indicate
that it was the intention of the lawmakers to protect each and every
mail bag from felonious injury and mutilation. Whenever any one
26
mail bag is thus torn, cut, or injured, the offense is complete.”
Although the conduct at issue arguably arose from a single
transaction, “the complete statutory offense was committed every
time a mail bag was cut in the manner described, with the intent
27
charged.” Thus the Court held that the defendant could be convicted
28
of a separate crime for every mailbag he damaged.
2. The Flaws in the Legislative Intent Approach. The legislativeintent approach is deeply problematic. Generally legislative intent
photographs of a minor in a sexual performance, even though each photograph involved the
same minor captured in “a narrow timeframe.” Id.
22. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915).
23. Id. at 628.
24. Id. at 629.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 631. A defendant who cut into a single piece of mail seven times, however, would
only have committed a single offense. See id. (“[P]roof of cutting and opening one sack
completed the offense . . . .”). In a similar case, Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916), the
Supreme Court considered how many offenses could be charged to a defendant who mailed
seven letters as part of a scheme to defraud, id. at 393. The defendant was convicted of seven
counts, one for each letter he mailed. Id. He appealed, arguing that the statute should be
construed to allow only a single charge for the entire scheme and that, if it were construed
otherwise, it would violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. The Court rejected the constitutional argument and upheld the seven
convictions, remarking the defendant’s “contentions need no extended answer.” Id. The Court,
relying on the Ebeling decision, stated simply that Congress had the ability to “make each
putting of a letter into the postoffice a separate offense.” Id. at 394.
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approaches have been criticized for a number of shortcomings. For
example, opponents have criticized the approach as “undemocratic
(committee reports are not enacted), unreliable (history is often
conflicting, and may even be planted to influence judges in the
future), and incoherent (the record does not represent the views of all
members of the legislature, so it cannot be evidence of ‘legislative
29
intent’).” As Justice Scalia has written, “opinions using legislative
history are often curiously casual, sometimes even careless, in their
analysis . . . . [I]t is simply hard to maintain a rigorously analytical
attitude, when the point of . . . inquiry is the fairyland in which
30
legislative history reflects what was in ‘the Congress’s mind.’”
Beyond the usual difficulties determining legislative intent,
courts especially struggle to decipher legislatures’ intentions
regarding how to charge offenses based on criminal statutes.
Legislative findings and individual legislators’ statements often do not
exist on the topic of the appropriate unit of prosecution: legislative
history almost always is silent on how to define the unit of
prosecution, and courts are left to invent, rather than discover, the
legislative intent that they rely on. As Chief Justice Warren wrote,
“[i]n every instance the problem is to ascertain what the legislature
intended. Often the inquiry produces few if any enlightening results.
Normally these are not problems that receive explicit legislative
31
consideration.”
Even when legislative statements do exist, they may not provide
reliable direction for courts because they may only provide abstract
principles and not reliable guidance on how to construe the statute
relative to the facts of a particular case. Legislative intent is often
multifaceted—legislatures may intend for a crime to be treated as a
single crime in some instances and multiple crimes in others—thus
providing minimal guidance to courts interpreting the statute. When a
legislature has several intentions or goals in mind, a court can choose
whichever best fits its own preferences rather than truly conducting
32
an analysis based on legislative intent.

29. Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative
Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 427 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
30. Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280–81 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
31. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 394 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting).
32. See supra text accompanying note 30.

CHEMERINSKY IN FINAL5.DOC

716

1/12/2009 12:06:45 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:709

The failings of the approach are illustrated by the seminal
Supreme Court case, Snow, which held that cohabitation over many
33
years constituted one offense. Although the Snow Court claimed
34
that it was basing its decision on legislative intent, a careful reading
of the case reveals no discussion of the legislative intent nor any
35
quotes from the legislature. Rather, the Court devoted the bulk of
its analysis to drawing an analogy to Crepps, the case involving the
36
sale of bread on Sundays. The analogy is inherently flawed,
however, as the Court failed to explain why cohabiting over thirtyfive months was indistinguishable from selling four loaves of bread on
37
a single day. If the baker opened his store every Sunday for ten
years, the reasoning of the Crepps court suggested that the baker
could be punished for every Sunday on which the statute was
38
violated. The reasoning from Crepps may have transferred to Snow
better if the issue in Snow had been whether Snow could be charged
based on his number of wives; the number of wives with whom Snow
cohabited appears analogous to the number of loaves of bread the
Crepps defendant sold on a given Sunday. But Snow was not about
that issue; Snow was about the time period of the cohabitation and
39
whether it was an ongoing offense. Snow claimed to be, and has
been read as, an endorsement of the importance of examining
40
legislative intent, when in fact there are no cites to legislative history
41
or proceedings in the case. It was an inadequately reasoned analysis
of the indivisibility of certain kinds of conduct, which Part I.C
42
discusses as the “act approach.”
The weakness in the Court’s analysis of the legislative intent in
Snow is not simply a failure of that Court; rather it exemplifies the
larger difficulty with this approach: courts lack precise standards for
assessing whether the legislature intended to make a series of acts a

33. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 285 (1887).
34. See supra text accompanying note 17.
35. In re Snow, 120 U.S. at 285.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Crepps v. Durden, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B.)).
39. For a discussion of how the Snow court focused on the time period of the cohabitation
to hold that a “continu[ous] offence of the character of the one in this case can be committed
but once,” id. at 282, see infra notes 88–93.
40. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
41. In re Snow, 120 U.S. at 274–86.
42. See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
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single crime or several. In many cases, the legislature failed to
consider the unit of prosecution at all or failed to consider most of the
almost-unlimited number of situations that could arise. For example,
in criminalizing the act of rape, any legislature intends as a matter of
sheer logic that raping the same woman on two separate nights merits
two separate counts of rape. The legislature, however, is unlikely to
fully articulate the reasoning or engage in the difficult line drawing
that is necessary. For example, is rape on two different nights
distinguishable from circumstances in which a man penetrates a
woman twice within a one hour period because she was able to get
away briefly? Would the latter situation constitute two counts of rape
as well? A legislature likely did not anticipate this kind of situation
when enacting the rape law. Even when legislatures anticipate these
issues, they likely avoid such questions for fear of creating too narrow
a rule that punishes someone for only one offense when punishment
for multiple offense is appropriate. As a result, courts traditionally
offer little beyond conclusory language, like that employed in
43
Ebeling, simply suggesting that the legislature clearly intended to
punish each act separately.
B. A Criminal Impulse–Based Approach
1. The Criminal-Impulse Approach Defined. The Supreme
44
Court’s decision in Blockburger v. United States epitomizes the
impulse test. The defendant was charged with five counts of violating
45
the Harrison Narcotics Act. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as
to the second, third, and fifth counts, each of which involved a sale of
46
morphine hydrochloride to the same purchaser. The second count

43. See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text.
44. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302 (1932).
45. Id. at 300.
46. Id. at 301. The other issue was whether one incident constituted multiple, different
offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Id. Counts two and three alleged that the drugs were not
in or from the original stamped package, and count five charged that the sale alleged in count
three was not made by a written order of the purchaser as required by the law. Id. Thus the
question in the case was, when the defendant completed one act—one sale—and it violated two
sections of the statute, did the accused commit two offenses or only one? Id. The Court held
that the defendant committed two offenses. Id. at 304. The Court noted that the statute was
aimed at the sale of drugs in violation of the requirements set forth in sections one and two. Id.
The Court then established the standard it continues to use as the test for double jeopardy:
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element. The applicable
rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
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charged a sale on a certain day of ten grains of the drug, and the third
count charged a sale on the following day of eight grains to the same
47
person. The defendant argued that two of the sales, “having been
made to the same purchaser and following each other, with no
substantial interval of time between the delivery of the drug in the
first transaction and the payment for the second quantity sold,
48
constitute[d] a single continuing offense.” The Court rejected this
argument, noting that the Harrison Narcotic Act “does not create the
offense of engaging in the business of selling . . . drugs, but penalizes
any sale” and “[e]ach of several successive sales constitutes a distinct
49
offense, however closely they may follow each other.” The Court
determined that “[t]he distinction . . . is that, ‘when the impulse is
single, but one indictment lies, no matter how long the action may
continue. If successive impulses are separately given, even though all
unite in swelling a common stream of action, separate indictments
50
lie.’” On this reasoning, the Court found that the defendant’s first
transaction resulted in a sale and the act came to an end when the sale
51
was complete. The next sale “was not the result of the original
52
impulse, but of a fresh one—that is to say, of a new bargain.”
Subsequently, the Supreme Court both applied impulse analysis
and considered legislative intent in United States v. Universal C.I.T.
53
Credit Corp. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation was charged with
thirty-two separate counts of violating the minimum wage, overtime,
54
and record-keeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Counts one through six charged the employer with violating the
55
minimum wage provisions in six separate weeks. Counts seven
through twenty-six charged the employer with overtime violations in
56
twenty separate weeks, amounting to one violation each week. The
offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not.
Id. Applying that test, the Court concluded that although both sections were violated by one
sale, two offenses were committed. Id.
47. Id. at 301.
48. Id. at 301–02.
49. Id. at 302.
50. Id. (quoting WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 34 (11th ed. 1912)).
51. Id. at 303.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1952).
54. Id. at 219.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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remaining counts alleged in the complaint concerned miscellaneous
57
record-keeping violations. The trial court granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss all but three counts of the complaint and rejected
the prosecution’s argument that the employer committed a separate
58
offense each week it breached a statutory duty to each employee.
Holding that “it is a course of conduct rather than the separate items
in such course that constitutes the punishable offense,” the trial court
“ordered consolidation of the separate acts set forth in the
59
information into three counts” —one each for the minimum wage,
60
overtime, and record-keeping violations.
The Supreme Court began by noting that the language of the
Fair Labor Standards Act did not address the issue and then observed
61
that the legislative intent was also unclear. Candidly acknowledging
that “[i]t would be self-deceptive to claim that only one answer is
possible to our problem,” the Court rejected the government’s
construction of the statute on the ground that “[t]he offense made
punishable under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a course of
conduct. . . . [Thus] the statute compendiously treats as one offense all
violations that arise from that singleness of thought, purpose or
62
action, which may be deemed a single ‘impulse.’”
As an illustration, the Court noted that a managerial decision
that certain activity was not work and therefore did not require
payment under the Fair Labor Standards Act could not become
multiple offenses by considering underpayment in a single week or to
63
a single employee as a separate offense. By only precluding counting
an ongoing violation stemming from a single decision as multiple
violations of the same statute, the Court held open the possibility that
the government could charge separate statutory offenses for separate
64
courses of conduct. Thus, the Court implied that the government
could bring separate charges for different decisions. For example,
employers might commit two offenses by deciding twice that certain

57. Id.
58. Id. at 220.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 220–21.
61. Id. at 221.
62. Id. at 224.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 225 (“Whether an aggregate of acts constitute a single course of conduct and
therefore a single offense, or more than one, may not be capable of ascertainment merely from
the bare allegations of an information and may have to await the trial on the facts.”).
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conduct does not constitute work. The Court did not precisely define
what constitutes a decision to undertake a single course of conduct
and how to determine if one is made; it simply held that the facts
before it constituted only three: one minimum wage violation, one
65
overtime violation, and one record-keeping violation.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Sanchez-Rengifo
66
v. United States also relied on the impulse test to support a
67
conviction for four separate acts of rape over a span of two hours.
The court stated that “criminal acts are considered separate when
there is an appreciable length of time ‘between the acts that constitute
the two offenses, or when a subsequent criminal act was not the result
68
of the original impulse, but a fresh one.’” The court held that the
evidence could sustain four convictions because during the two hours
69
of attack, the defendant came to “a fork in the road” four times,
each time giving the defendant a chance to stop and reconsider his
70
actions. The court reasoned that “[t]here was time during this two
hour period for Sanchez-Rengifo to reflect as he ordered his victim
into different positions after completing one form of sexual assault in
71
order to undertake another to satisfy his new impulse.” The court
concluded that when “the circumstances are such that the ‘defendant
can be said to have realized that he has come to a fork in the road,
and nevertheless decides to invade a different interest, then his
72
successive intentions make him subject to cumulative punishment.’”
2. The Flaws in the Impulse Approach. Relying on impulses in
these cases as the critical factor for determining the unit of
prosecution presents two problems. First, impulse is ambiguously
65. Id. at 220–21, 226 (“All we now decide is that the district judge correctly held that a
single course of conduct does not constitute more than one offense under . . . the Fair Labor
Standards Act.”).
66. Sanchez-Rengifo v. United States, 815 A.2d 351 (D.C. 2002).
67. Id. at 352–53 (affirming a conviction for four separate counts of child sexual abuse
stemming from a two-hour continuous assault of one victim).
68. Id. at 355 (quoting Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845, 853 (D.C. 1995)).
69. Id. at 353.
70. Id. at 357, 359 (quoting Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. 1985)).
71. Id. at 359.
72. Id. (quoting Owens, 497 A.2d at 1095); accord State v. Soonalole, 992 P.2d 541, 542, 544
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that two separate acts of fondling during one car ride were two
separate offenses); State v. Rummer, 432 S.E.2d 39, 47–48 (W. Va. 1993). In State v. Williams,
730 P.2d 1196, 1199 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986), the court held that fondling the victim’s breasts and
fondling the victim’s genitalia within less than five minutes of each other constituted two
separate offenses.
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defined and thus not useful in deciding the number of crimes
committed. Is an impulse synonymous with intent? If impulse and
intent are different, precisely how are they different? For example,
although the court in Sanchez-Rengifo broke the defendant’s actions
into four impulses, it is possible that throughout the entire course of
conduct he only had a single intent—to conduct the rape. If “impulse”
and “intent” are the same or interchangeable, it raises the question
why the court would use the word “impulse” rather than “intent.”
Second, how does one determine an “impulse”? Is it a function
of time or opportunity to retreat from criminality? Determining
impulse based on forks in the road seems inherently and inevitably
subjective. Defendants in both types of cases—those in which a single
crime is charged and those in which multiple crimes are charged—
faced forks in the road. The defendant in Sanchez-Rengifo had many
opportunities to stop but continued with the course of action: one
could argue that every minute during which the assault continued—
each an opportunity to stop his unlawful activity—was a fork in the
road. The employer who violated the Fair Labor Standards Act had
many opportunities—at least every time a paycheck was issued—to
reevaluate its business practices. Each passing second presents an
opportunity for a person engaged in criminal activity to assess the
evils of the action and to choose a different course of conduct.
A great deal also depends on which “impulse” courts analyze
because an action often has several different impulses or
73
motivations. As Professor H.L.A. Hart explained in his famous essay
on criminal acts and intentions, “[t]he performance of a human action
is a very complex affair involving the co-presence and the co74
ordination of many different elements.” If in Blockburger the seller
agreed to provide the buyer with a set amount of narcotics for a set
price every week and then did so, would the arrangement be
73. The court held that
the facts and circumstances of this case weigh[] in favor of finding that Soto’s multiple
drug sales constituted separate and distinct offenses . . . . Each of the four sales took
place on a different day and at a different place, with the exception that two of the
sales occurred in the same parking lot. The separate sales were not motivated by a
desire to obtain a single criminal objective. While Soto and other defendants
convicted of drug sales may be motivated by the single criminal objective of selling
drugs to relieve financial hardship, this court has held that the criminal plan of
obtaining as much money as possible is too broad an objective to constitute a single
criminal goal . . . .
State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn. 1997).
74. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 90 (rev. ed. 2008).
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considered a single impulse because it was negotiated and agreed to
only once, or would it be several impulses because of the multiple
exchanges? If one analogizes the ongoing agreement to buy drugs to a
commercial contract, one might think of it as a single contract or a
single business decision, as the Supreme Court characterized the
75
determination of pay practices in Universal C.I.T Credit Corp. On
the other hand, if one views it as a series of separate agreements, it
becomes a series of frauds. Impulse is simply too imprecise a concept
on which to decide cases.
C. An Act-Based Approach
1. The Act-Based Approach Defined. A third approach requires
looking at the facts holistically to determine whether there was one
76
continuous crime or several distinct crimes. Some courts, for
example, analyze whether the actions were one whole act or whether
they comprised several discrete acts by considering whether the acts
are “separated by an evidentiary factor such as time, place, or
77
intervening circumstance.” A continuous offense has been defined
as “a breach of the criminal law not terminated by a single act or fact,
but which subsists for a definite period and is intended to cover or
78
apply to successive similar obligations or occurrences.”
Furthermore, as another court explained, “[s]ome crimes, by their
very nature, tend to be committed in a single continuous episode
79
rather than in a series of individually chargeable acts.”
The best example of this “acts” approach is the reasoning in
80
Johnson v. Commonwealth, which affirmed the defendant’s multiple
convictions for illegal gambling after playing poker for four
81
consecutive hours. The defendant played “[seventy-five] or more
combined contributions, designated by the witnesses as ‘pots’; that at
the end of each deal of the cards the winner would take the pot, and
75. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952).
76. United States v. Prestenbach, 230 F.3d 780, 783 (5th Cir. 2000). This is sometimes called
a fact-based approach. See, e.g., Morris v. United States, 622 A.2d 1116, 1130 (D.C. 1993) (“[A]
fact-based approach remains appropriate where a defendant is convicted of two violations of the
same statute.”).
77. Gray v. United States, 544 A.2d 1255, 1257 (D.C. 1988).
78. State v. Johnson, 194 S.E. 319, 322 (N.C. 1937).
79. Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1096 (D.C. 1985).
80. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 388 (Ky. 1923).
81. Id. at 388 (defining the act of illegal gambling as “engaging in a game of hazard or
chance at which money or other property was bet, won, or lost”).
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after that another or a new deal would be made with the same
82
result.” The court ruled that each hand of cards and respective new
wager accompanying it was a discrete act, and thus each could be
83
charged as a separate offense. The court held that each act is
“complete upon the determination of the event upon which the stake
is made, and that the determination of another one upon which an
independent separate and different stake is made would constitute
84
and be a separate and distinct hazard or game.” Thus with each new
hand, those “participating therein would be guilty of another and
85
independent offense.” The court ruled that because a single hand
could be a violation of the law, “it would seem to necessarily follow
that a conviction or acquittal for playing one hand . . . [which] is a
complete offense, would not be a bar to a prosecution for playing
86
another hand, although both may have occurred at the same sitting.”
The Supreme Court’s decision in Snow, discussed above,
provides another example. Although the Court couched its language
in legislative intent when holding that there was only a single
87
cohabitation, in reality the Court rested its decision mostly on an
88
act-based approach. The Court emphasized that the indictment
suggested that the nature of the offense was irreducible because the
indictments plainly stated that “the defendant did on the day named
and thereafter and continuously, for the time specified, live and
89
cohabit with more than one woman.” The indictment emphasized
that all of the offenses “were alike in all respects except that each
90
covered a different period of time.”
The Court in Snow held that dividing the cohabitation into three
separate offenses, as the lower court allowed, would be “wholly
91
arbitrary.” The Court reasoned that once any divisions are made
there is no clear place to stop and there could be any number of
charges: “an indictment covering each of the thirty-five months, with

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
I.A.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id.
For a discussion of the legislative approach adopted by the Snow court, see supra Part
In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 282 (1887).
Id. at 281 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 282.
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imprisonment for seventeen years and a half and fines amounting to
$10,500, or even an indictment covering every week, with
imprisonment for seventy-four years and fines amounting to $44,400;
92
and so on, ad infinitum, for smaller periods of time.” The Court
concluded that the rule should be that a “continu[ous] offence of the
character of the one in this case can be committed but once . . . . [I]t
was the mere will of the grand jury which divided the time among
three indictments, and stopped short of dividing it among thirty-five,
93
or one hundred and fifty-two, or even more.”
94
The court in Krueger v. Coplan also used an act-based approach
when considering how to categorize a sexual offense in which,
“[d]uring a twenty-five minute period, petitioner repeatedly . . .
95
coaxed a two-year-old child to perform oral sex upon him.” The
prosecution, by using videotape of the incident, split the twenty-fiveminute period into ninety separate offenses: “eighty counts of
aggravated felonious sexual assault, seven counts of attempted
aggravated felonious sexual assault, two counts of felonious sexual
96
assault, and one count of simple assault.” The court allowed all these
charges to go forward, holding that “each separate act or attempted
act of fellatio constituted a distinct offense, and could not be
consolidated into one count alleging a general course of conduct
97
involving several incidents of intentional touching.”
98
Similarly, in State v. Shelton, the court considered whether a
repetitive pattern of incest was a continuing offense or a single
99
offense. The statute stated that a “person commits the offense of
92. Id.
93. Id.; see also State v. Grady, 524 S.E.2d 75, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (determining that a
man could only be prosecuted for one count of violating a statute that prohibited maintaining a
dwelling for purposes of narcotics dealing, even though the man was caught making two drug
sales from his house).
94. Krueger v. Coplan, 238 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D.N.H. 2002).
95. Id. at 392.
96. Id. at 394.
97. Id.; cf. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 273 & n.7 (Ky. 2006) (holding that
every act causing an injury was a separate criminal offense, and so the defendant committed
seven assaults by burning the victim in seven places with a cigarette lighter).
98. State v. Shelton, 605 S.E.2d 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
99. Id. at 230. The Court also considered the legislative intent in a cursory manner and
found it inconclusive. The Court evaluated the statute and found “[t]he statutory language does
not reveal any legislative intent to prohibit prosecuting a defendant for more than one count of
incest per victim.” Id.; see also State v. Richard, 786 A.2d 876, 878–79 (N.H. 2001) (conducting
the same analysis in the context of a repeating pattern of sexual assaults and finding that each
was an individual crime).
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incest if the person engages in carnal intercourse with the
100
person’s . . . child.” The defendant admitted to several acts of incest
with two victims but challenged his multiple convictions on the
101
ground that he could only be convicted of one count for each victim.
The court disagreed, holding that each time the defendant and the
102
victim had intercourse was an independent crime. Unlike the
Krueger court, however, the Shelton court did not break up each
103
incident of intercourse into several acts.
104
In Hennemeyer v. Commonwealth, the court again applied a
fact-based, acts approach and held that a course of conduct
105
106
constituted separate offenses. In that case, the defendant fired his
gun four times at police officers “at irregular intervals, with a lapse of
107
as much as two minutes to as little as seconds between the shots.”
108
Hennemeyer managed to escape and the next day got in another
conflict with police. This time Hennemeyer fired five shots at a police
109
car over a roughly fifteen-minute period. The entire chase spanned
over four miles and ended when the driver and Hennemeyer fled on
110
foot. While fleeing, Hennemeyer fired one more shot at the
111
pursuing police. Hennemeyer ran into an abandoned warehouse,
where he soon was captured.

100. Shelton, 605 S.E.2d at 230 (alteration in original) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-178
(2003)).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
104. Hennemeyer v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 211 (Ky. 1979).
105. Id. at 215. Because the court in Hennemeyer claimed it was reaching its decision relying
on legislative intent, id. at 214–15, this case also epitomizes the overlap between the different
categories. This case belongs in this Section rather than Section A, which discusses legislative
intent, however, because, although the court claimed it was looking at the intent, it never really
explained how it determined what the intent was. Moreover, it never explained why the intent
would justify treating the actions on day one different from day two. Thus, although this case
could provide a dual function, it reinforces the weakness of both the legislative intent and act
approach.
106. The court referred to Christopher Hennemeyer as a “nomad,” and the incident started
when he was “about to relieve himself in front of the Pic Pac Market . . . and the manager
protested.” Id. at 212.
107. Id. at 213.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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The trial judge ruled that the first four shots constituted a single
course of conduct, whereas the six shots fired the next day were each
112
considered discrete crimes. Thus, Hennemeyer was charged with
113
and convicted of seven counts of wanton endangerment.
Hennemeyer was sentenced to seven years total: one year for the first
four shots—which the court had merged into one offense—and one
114
year for each of the six single-shot charges. Presumably his sentence
was considerably greater than it would have been if the trial court had
115
merged the six charges and run the sentences concurrently. The
court upheld his conviction, reasoning that the legislature intended to
116
punish each “particular act.” Because the legislature intended to
punish each “particular act,” the court held that the defendant could
be charged with one count for each shot fired rather than only one
117
count for the entire continuing conduct of firing a gun.
By contrast, and seemingly in contradiction, the court in Smith v.
118
United States held that a defendant committed a single assault when
he beat the victim with a curling iron and hammer and then threw the
119
victim down the stairs. The court held that “[t]he fact that a criminal
episode of assault involves several blows or wounds, and different
methods of administration, does not convert it into a case of multiple
120
crimes for purposes of sentencing.” The court said that the
determination is made on a case-by-case basis, and “[w]hile
cumulative punishments for these crimes may be imposed in an
appropriate case[,] . . . . [i]t must be clear from the record . . . that the
actions and intent of defendant constitute distinct successive criminal
121
episodes, rather than two phases of a single assault.”
2. The Flaws in the Act-Based Approach. Courts’ descriptions of
acts as complete or continuing often (perhaps inevitably) lack
articulated principles. These descriptions, which are based on

112. Id.
113. Id. at 212.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 214.
116. Id. at 215.
117. Id. The court did not object, though, to the trial court’s combining of the first four shots
into one charge. Id. at 214.
118. Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
119. Id. at 1121.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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intuitions about the divisibility of certain conduct, appear either
arbitrary or, perhaps, rest on the judges’ own views about the
wrongfulness of some acts as opposed to others. In Snow, for
example, the Court insisted that any subdivision of the time of the
122
cohabitation would be arbitrary, but it failed to recognize as equally
arbitrary its own decision to treat Snow’s conduct as a single,
continuous act. Without some account of the considerations that
made three or thirty-five or one-hundred counts arbitrary, the Court
ended up with just another number—one.
Moreover, the Court did not address other ends of justice, aside
from the purely punitive aims of prosecution, that perhaps favored
punishing the thirty-five-month-long cohabitation as multiple
123
offenses. For example, if cohabitation violates a community’s sense
of decency, then someone who cohabits for ten years would be more
culpable than someone who cohabits for ten days and thus would
124
deserve a more severe punishment. From the perspective of the
wives, it might have been that each day they woke up to the
realization that they were in a plural marriage was a new insult and a
new day of suffering. By depicting the crime as one continuing
offense, the Court overlooked the fact that during the ongoing
cohabitation the defendant faced numerous choices, each of which
would have allowed him to change course and end the illegal conduct,
but chose to continue his illegal conduct. But if the Court had
adopted this perspective, should it have imagined the defendant to
have made his choices daily, weekly, or monthly?
Perhaps most puzzling is the court’s decision in Hennemeyer: if
firing four shots on the first day was a single offense, why was firing
125
six shots on the second day six separate crimes? Did it matter that

122. In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 282 (1887).
123. Id.
124. One court employed a culpability analysis, determining that a defendant who moved
three times violated a registration statute each time. People v. Meeks, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 445, 452–
53 (Ct. App. 2004). The court reasoned that
every time defendant moves, this triggers a new registration requirement, each of
which continues indefinitely and overlaps with the one before it. However, each is a
separate offense. The purpose of [the statute] is to insure that a defendant’s
punishment will be commensurate with his culpability. Under the circumstances of
this case, failure to punish defendant for each failure to register would violate this
purpose. A defendant who repeatedly moves without notifying authorities . . . is
surely more culpable than one who fails to register following only one triggering
event.
Id. at 453.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 112–16.
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the defendant fired the shots on the second day in different
locations—over the course of a several-mile chase—whereas the
defendant fired all shots on the first day from basically the same spot?
It is unclear how much time mattered—the shots on the second day
took place over a fifteen-minute span, whereas the shots on the first
day all occurred within a few minutes. The court never discussed
which facts led it to consolidate the first four shots into a single
charge but to treat the next six shots as distinct acts.
The rationale provided in Johnson—that the first poker hand
was sufficient for prosecution and therefore each hand should
126
constitute a separate offense —is most unsatisfying. Many crimes
could be split into several acts according to this justification. By this
logic, the Court in Snow could have ruled that each night of
cohabitation was illegal and therefore prosecution for one night of
cohabitation should not bar prosecution for the other nights because
one night by itself would have been enough for a criminal
prosecution.
The reasoning of the court in Krueger is suspect for the same
reason. Was there really a separate crime committed by the defendant
each time the child paused while being forced to perform oral sex?
Was there not, as the Supreme Court has considered determinative in
127
other situations, a singleness of thought, purpose, or action, that
may be deemed a single impulse? How could this ever be determined
128
in the typical case of sexual assault that is not recorded? Under the
Court’s reasoning in Krueger, a single sexual assault would be
virtually impossible to commit, given that nearly all such assaults
would involve a series of stops and starts. The reasoning of both
Krueger and Johnson would almost always favor splitting the offense
into several crimes.
D. A Time-Based Approach
1. A Time-Based Approach Defined. When assessing the number
of crimes comitted, many courts examine the time period during
which the acts took place. After all, if one were to consider why
126. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W. 388, 389 (Ky. 1923).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952)
(consolidating multiple weeks of minimum wage and other violations into single counts because
the violations arose from single impulses). For a discussion on the impulse approach, see supra
Part I.B.
128. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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charging a suspect who fires five shots in fairly rapid succession with
five separate counts is troubling, the issue of time instinctively comes
to mind. The compressed time period, many would argue, indicates
one criminal act. Some statutes specifically mention time. For
example, Indiana’s criminal code defines a single episode of criminal
conduct as “offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely
129
related in time, place, and circumstance.”
Courts often examine time in their analysis. In Hennemeyer, the
court likely intuitively based its view that shooting at patrol cars on
separate and consecutive days constituted two separate offenses in
130
part on the passage of time. On the other hand, many courts have
considered the time factor and rejected it as not determinative or
131
insufficient. In State v. Soonalole, the court allowed a prosecutor to
charge separate acts of fondling within one car ride as separate
132
133
crimes. In State v. Rummer, the court upheld as separate offenses
acts of fondling that consisted of touching breasts and genitals,
134
respectively, during a brief attack. And, in Sanchez-Rengifo v.
United States, the court held four sex acts committed over two hours
to be separate offenses, but only considered time in the context of
135
determining that the acts reflected separate impulses. On the other
hand, time appeared to be the determining factor in allowing separate
136
counts for injuries inflicted in Ratliff v. Commonwealth, when the
trial court instructed the jury that there would be one count of
criminal abuse related to “older” bruises on the victim’s body and
137
another count for the “newer” bruises.
2. Flaws in the Time-Based Approach. Although a rule based on
time may seem straightforward and easy to administer, it would
create several problems. Setting a standard based solely on a set time
period would lead to unfair and arbitrary results. Why should the
court choose fifteen minutes as opposed to ten hours; what measure
would the court use to determine the appropriate amount of time?

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

IND. CODE § 35-50-1-2(b) (2004).
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
State v. Soonalole, 992 P.2d 541 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 543–44.
State v. Rummer, 432 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1993).
Id. at 50.
See Sanchez-Rengifo v. United States, 815 A.2d 351, 359 (D.C. 2002).
Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 273 (Ky. 2006).
Id.
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Rules would have to be tailored to set a different temporal limitation
to each offense, as crimes such as rape or a payroll violation require
different standards. Legislatures would struggle to define the time
period fairly and courts would struggle to determine the time period
during which the offense occured. If a statute presumed that acts
committed within fifteen minutes were continuous, it would produce
absurd results when defendants miss the time cutoff by seconds. For
example, is a defendant who plays poker for sixteen minutes any
more morally culpable than someone who plays for fifteen minutes?
Would a different charge make sense solely on the basis of the oneminute difference?
Finally, any time standard would be flawed according to
deterrence and retributive rationales of punishment. A rule that
treats acts within a set time period as presumptively one crime would
do nothing to deter someone from throwing an additional punch or
138
illegally opening an additional piece of mail within that time frame.
A set-time-period rule would encourage, or at least not discourage, a
person who has already committed one illegal act to repeat that or
similar acts as often as possible within the set time period. Moreover,
retributive theories of punishment would often be thwarted by
punishment tied solely to a time period. If punishments are supposed
to reflect the moral wrong committed, someone who threw ten
punches against one victim in five minutes might be more morally
culpable than someone who threw only one. Focusing exclusively on
time would prevent considering moral culpability.
II. WHY THE LACK OF CLEAR STANDARDS IS TROUBLING
This Part outlines three major reasons why determining when an
act is a single crime or multiple criminal acts is important to criminal
law. First, deciding whether conduct should be split into many acts or
punished as one raises questions of fundamental fairness in the
criminal justice system. Second, the ambiguity in the charging and
punishing of these offenses increases the chances of prosecutorial
misconduct. Finally, charging an offense as multiple crimes raises
double jeopardy concerns.

138. Cf. People v. Fielder, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 12, 16 (Ct. App. 2007) (depublished) (punishing a
person only once for failing to report a change of address would give him an incentive to move
multiple times without informing the police, with each move compounding the difficulty of
surveilling him).
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A. Issues of Fairness
Dividing certain conduct into several distinct acts of criminality
raises four questions of fundamental fairness. First, without the
guidance of legislative intent in many of these cases there is no
reliable metric to determine whether a punishment is just. Second, the
division of one incident into dozens or scores of separate felonies may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. Third, dividing a single incident into multiple offenses
allows the application of recidivist statutes in ways that raise due
process concerns or at least raise serious questions of fairness. Finally,
inconsistency in the law risks unfairness in the criminal process simply
because defendants in similar positions are treated differently.
1. Ambiguity in Legislative Intent Can Lead to Ambiguity in
Determining Fair Punishments. First, a fair process can easily be
thwarted given the lack of clear legislative standards. Courts have
long struggled to find an external source for determining whether a
sentence is just. Ultimately, though, courts have not come up with a
valid measure for “what type of punishment is the ‘right’ amount or
type for any particular offense. History [has not been of]
assist[ance] . . . as penalties for common law crimes have changed
over time, and most of today’s crime[s] did not exist at common law.
139
Precedent will not help . . . .”
Because no real external source can determine in most cases how
much or what type of punishment is appropriate, “the Court has
regularly deferred to the legislative selection of the ‘right’
140
punishment.” Legislative intent, however, as discussed in Part I.A,
141
is unclear in the vast majority of these crimes. Given the ambiguity
in legislative intent, courts lack a basis for determining whether a
sentence is fair. Although legislative intent may be clear about the
sentence per offense, the lack of clarity as to what constitutes an
offense renders legislative intent almost useless as a guide in deciding
how many offenses should be charged. Thus, although legislative

139. Susan R. Klein, Double Jeopardy’s Demise, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (2000) (book
review).
140. Id. In some ways, the question of a fair sentence is like the question of how many
crimes to charge. In both situations, extremes—that is, sentences that are obviously too light or
too heavy—are easily identifiable. But a great number of cases are bound to be questionable or
borderline.
141. See supra Part I.A.
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intent is the most common and traditional method for determining if
a punishment fits a crime, it is of little or no use in determining if
multiple charges and the resulting punishment are fair.
2. The Potential for Disproportionate Sentencing. A second and
related fairness issue concerns whether the defendant receives a
punishment proportionate to the crime committed within
142
constitutional limitations. The law on disproportional sentences is a
143
murky area and “[o]utside the context of capital punishment,
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences
144
have been exceedingly rare.” Nonetheless, courts have at times
concluded that certain sentences, even if intended by the legislature,
are disproportionate and thus constitute cruel and unusual
145
punishment.
The Supreme Court dealt with disproportionate
146
sentencing in two key cases. First, in Coker v. Georgia, the Court
held that imposing the death penalty was disproportionate for the

142. For a general discussion of the Eighth Amendment, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). In Furman, the Court explained,
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted
arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no
reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less
severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the
command of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized
punishments upon those convicted of crimes.
Id. at 282.
143. See Robert Batey, The Cost of Judicial Restraint: Forgone Opportunities to Limit
America’s Imprisonment Binge, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29, 56 (2007)
(“Indeed, a majority of the justices seems determined to limit the number of constitutionally
disproportionate sentences of imprisonment to an infinitesimal few.”).
144. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
145. Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343, slip op. at 25 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2008) (“The constitutional
prohibition against excessive or cruel and unusual punishments mandates that the State’s power
to punish ‘be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.’ Evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society counsel us to be most hesitant before interpreting
the Eighth Amendment to allow the extension of the death penalty, a hesitation that has special
force where no life was taken in the commission of the crime.” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion))); Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 773 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a sentence of twenty-five years to life under California’s three strikes law for
stealing a $199 VCR after two previous shoplifting convictions was cruel and unusual
punishment); Banyard v. Duncan, 342 F. Supp. 2d 865, 871 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that a
sentence of twenty-five years to life for possession of less than a gram of rock cocaine under
California Three Strikes Law was cruel and unusual); State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 75 (Ariz. 2003)
(en banc) (ruling a sentence of fifty-two years without possibility of parole for four counts of
sexual misconduct with a minor cruel and unusual).
146. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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crime of raping an adult woman. Second, in Solem v. Helm, the
Supreme Court held that a life sentence without the possibility of
parole under a South Dakota recidivist statute was disproportionate
to the offense of passing a bad check for $100 after several previous
149
convictions. In both cases, the courts used a three-prong test to
determine disproportionality: (1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for
150
151
the same crime in other jurisdictions. In Harmelin v. Michigan, the
Court ruled that a life sentence for 650 grams of cocaine did not
152
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In a fractured opinion,
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote that there is
153
no proportionality requirement under the Eighth Amendment,
154
155
directly criticized Solem, and voted to uphold the conviction.
Justice White, joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun, dissented
from the opinion, advocated for a robust proportionality requirement,
156
and voted to strike down the life sentence. Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justices O’Connor and Souter, wrote that there is a narrow
proportionality requirement but that the life sentence for Harmelin
157
did not violate the requirement.
158
Ewing v. California clarified the law when the Supreme Court
159
upheld the application of the California three-strikes law against a
defendant who had stolen three golf clubs, each worth $399, and was
160
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. In doing so, the Court
147. Id. at 597. Similarly, on Oct. 1, 2008, the Supreme Court held in Kennedy that
imposition of the death penalty was likewise disproportionate for rape of a child. Kennedy, slip
op. at 36. This ruling purportedly invalidates the Louisiana law along with the five other similar
capital provisions then existing in Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas.
Id., slip op. at 12.
148. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
149. Id. at 303.
150. Id. at 292.
151. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
152. Id. at 994.
153. Id. at 965 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
154. See id. at 967 (“The error of Solem’s assumption is confirmed by the historical context
and contemporaneous understanding of the English guarantee.”).
155. Id. at 996 (majority opinion).
156. Id. at 1014 (White, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 996–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
158. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
159. See infra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
160. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17–18.
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endorsed the “narrow” interpretation of the proportionality
161
Although the Court’s Eighth Amendment
requirement.
jurisprudence has defined the proportionality requirement narrowly,
at some point the charging of separate crimes can be so extreme as to
be cruel and unusual punishment.
The Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause (which has
never been applied in these cases) are the sole constitutional
restrictions on excessive sentencing. Part III.B discusses how courts
should apply the Eighth Amendment in multiple units of prosecution
cases to achieve more consistent and just results.
3. The Danger in Applying Recidivist Statutes. The dangers of an
unfair sentence are magnified by the proliferation of habitualoffender statutes. Many states have laws in place that allow harsher
punishment for an offender who commits multiple crimes on the
ground that the offender is a recidivist and therefore more
162
incorrigible and deserving of harsher treatment. Additionally, these
laws provide longer sentences to protect society by keeping these
163
criminals off the street and deterring criminal activity.
The problem is that a person could be charged under a habitualoffender statute for a single incident that is treated as multiple units
164
of prosecution. The prosecutor’s decision in People v. Haskell
exemplifies this risk: the prosecutor charged Craig Haskell with four
counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree for penetrating

161. Id. at 20–22.
162. Id. at 15 (“Between 1993 and 1995, [twenty-four] states and the Federal Government
enacted three strikes laws. Though the three strikes laws vary from State to State, they share a
common goal of protecting the public safety by providing lengthy prison terms for habitual
felons.” (citation omitted)).
163. See id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he purpose of California’s three strikes law [is]:
incapacitation.”). The California legislature initially adopted the three-strikes law as a statute,
and voters then approved it as an initiative. Joy M. Donham, Third Strike or Merely a Foul Tip?:
The Gross Disproportionality of Lockyer v. Andrade, 38 AKRON L. REV. 369, 373 (2005). Mike
Reynolds, the father of a murdered child, first proposed the law. Id. But the well-publicized
murder of young Polly Klaas ultimately guaranteed the law’s passage. See id. (“Three Strikes’
ultimate passage was most importantly influenced by the murder of Polly Klaas.”). Klaas, a
twelve-year-old, was taken from her home in Petuluma, California, in October 1993 by an
offender who had been convicted twice previously and had recently been paroled from state
prison. Id. at 373 n.32. For an excellent discussion and critique of the California three-strikes
law, see generally Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and
Criminal Deterrence, 34 CONN. L. REV. 55 (2001).
164. People v. Haskell, No. 251929, 2005 WL 1489480 (Mich. Ct. App. June 23, 2005) (per
curiam).
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The prosecutor
the victim four times over a few minutes.
accordingly sought and received an enhancement for Haskell under a
habitual offender statute even though his only crimes occurred in
166
those few minutes. The court held that “[e]ach forcible sexual
penetration of the victim resulted in a separate conviction pursuant to
167
the plain language of the statute and relevant case law.” Moreover,
the judge, following Michigan state law, found these four convictions
168
sufficient to constitute a continuing pattern of criminal behavior.
The court held that “the evidence clearly indicated that the defendant
committed three or more crimes against the victim within a five year
169
period,” so the court was entitled to impose a heightened sentence
170
under the recidivist statute. Thus, for conduct that other courts may
have treated as one act of rape, the Michigan court found several acts
of rape as well as a continuing pattern of behavior that made him a
171
habitual offender.
Decisions whether an act or series of acts can be charged as
multiple offenses or as a single act presents significant ramifications if
recidivist statutes apply in these situations. A prosecutor’s decision to
charge an offense as multiple counts not only risks greater
punishment based on the statutory penalty for each crime, but it also
could dramatically change the penalty if the person is then charged as
a habitual offender. Such a possibility significantly raises the stakes in
the type of cases discussed in this Note and presents questions about
the fundamental fairness of the process. Part III.C of this Note
suggests that courts should consider decisions to charge offenses as
multiple counts when deciding whether to apply recidivist statutes.
4. The Danger of Inconsistency. Finally, ambiguity regarding
how many crimes to charge for a single act injects inconsistency into
how crimes are punished. Even if a sentence does not violate the
Eighth Amendment under either traditional-sentencing or enhancedsentencing statutes, concerns still remain about the fairness of the
practice. Deciding how to charge these offenses can lead to
inconsistent punishment and sentencing, inconsistencies which
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at *8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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threaten the appearance of fairness, if not actual fairness, of the
system. Congress passed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
specifically address the problems of disparate and inconsistent
172
sentencing. The system of punishment and imprisonment is based
on “a corresponding scale of penalties. Trivial offenses causing little
harm must not be punished as severely as offences causing great
173
harm . . . .” Inconsistent sentencing of two similar acts threatens the
174
very foundation of what is considered fairness in punishment.
The potential for tremendously disparate sentences for similar
acts also raises legitimacy concerns. Charging two defendants who
committed similar acts with substantially different offenses and giving
them significantly different sentences could weaken confidence in the
justice system. For example, serious questions of the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system are presented, if, in one case, a man who
forces a child to perform oral sex on him during a twenty-five-minute
period is charged with one count of felony sexual abuse and, in
another case, a different man is charged with ninety counts because
the prosecutor believed the act stopped and started ninety times in
that twenty-five minutes. The public, the victims, and the accused
might reasonably conclude that crimes are defined and sentences are
imposed not by the legislature, or even by judges obligated to treat
like cases alike, but at the whim of prosecutors.

172. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2486 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The general
object of Guidelines sentencing was the eminently laudable one of promoting substantial
consistency in exercising judicial discretion to sentence within the range set by statute for a
given crime.”).
173. HART, supra note 74, at 162.
174. By allowing judges to take a real-offense approach to sentencing, the Sentencing
Guidelines attempt to remedy charging abuses. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.3 (2004); see also David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 408 (1993) (“[A] ‘real-offense
element’ is any sentencing factor not included in the definition of the offense of conviction and
either established at trial or admitted by the defendant as part of a guilty plea.”).
Real-offense sentencing counterbalances prosecutorial discretion:
Linking the sentence imposed more closely to the offense of conviction, as all
sentencing guidelines systems do, increases the prosecutor's influence on sentences
because prosecutors have broad authority to select or reject the charges that might be
brought against the offender. In theory, then, a charge-based guidelines system shifts
a great deal of sentencing authority to prosecutors. Sentencing commissions have
considered whether it is possible and appropriate to counter this enhanced
prosecutorial influence by utilizing some version of real-offense sentencing.
David Yellen, Reforming the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Misguided Approach to RealOffense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 267, 270 (2005).
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B. Concerns about Prosecutorial Misconduct
The decision to charge a person with one offense or many is a
175
Although prosecutorial
matter of prosecutorial discretion.
discretion is a critical part of the criminal justice system, it also can be
abused. For example, some argue that prosecutors manipulate the
system of plea-bargaining by overcharging and thus increasing
176
pressure on defendants to plead guilty. The ability to charge
177
multiple acts instead of one act gives prosecutors enormous power.
A prosecutor who can make at least a colorable argument that an act
is divisible then has a powerful weapon to use during plea bargaining
even if the prosecutor thinks that the decision to file multiple charges
might not withstand the scrutiny of a trial or appellate court. Many
defendants facing lengthy sentences may be reluctant to test the
prosecutor’s willingness to charge multiple offenses, and there is very
178
little oversight of a prosecutor’s charging decisions. The Louisiana
Supreme Court recognized this discretion when it upheld twenty theft
charges for an ongoing theft that lasted eight months, noting that it
was purely a matter of prosecutorial discretion whether to charge the
defendant with twenty crimes of theft or just one for the aggregate
179
total amount stolen.
Moreover, even if prosecutors do not wield it as a sword in plea
bargaining, broad prosecutorial discretion in sentencing is

175. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
176. See Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal
Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 234 (“[F]ederal prosecutors can circumvent equality by
manipulating offense levels through charge bargaining . . . .”).
177. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1525 (1981) (“Decisions whether and what to charge, and whether and on what terms to
bargain, have been left in prosecutors’ hands with very few limitations.”).
178. See generally Abby L. Dennis, Note, Reining in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial
Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 136 (2007) (“This vast discretionary
authority is accompanied by little or no transparency. Indeed, prosecutors determine whom to
charge, what charges to file, and how to obtain convictions for those charges in secret. This
situation breeds potential for impropriety, as it vests in one official the power to invoke society’s
harshest sanctions on the basis of ad hoc personal judgments, which can often be capricious or
politically induced.” (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
179. State v. Joles, 492 So. 2d 490, 490 (La. 1986) (“[W]hen a person has been accused of
committing a series of distinct thefts which are properly joinable in a single bill of information,
the person may either be charged with one offense and sentenced upon conviction within the
sentencing range for the grade of the offense determined by the aggregate amount of all of the
thefts or may be charged with each separate offense and sentenced upon conviction within the
sentencing range for the grade of each particular offense determined by the amount of that
theft.”).
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180

disquieting. Providing the prosecutor with the ability to decide
whether to charge one count or fifty is unsettling because it vests so
much unchecked power in a single person. The possibility of
prosecutorial overzealousness in such a situation is not remote.
Indeed, the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized just this
181
possibility in State v. Krueger, discussed in Part I.C.1, involving the
ninety separate offenses arising from a twenty-five-minute period in
182
which a child was sexually abused. Although ultimately upholding
the right of the prosecutor to charge these separate offenses, the court
183
was “decidedly critical of the prosecution’s decision.” As the New
Hampshire Supreme Court concluded, “it is important to exercise
discretion with more circumspection when charging crimes under
184
these circumstances.”
The court continued to emphasize the
discretion and responsibility required from prosecutors because
courts “place a great deal of responsibility upon prosecutors to
exercise discretion without vengeance when charging a particular
defendant. Unfortunately, the manner in which the indictments were
charged in this case raises the specter of prosecutorial over185
zealousness.”
C. Double Jeopardy Problems
Finally, filing multiple charges for the same conduct violates the
prohibition on double jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment states that no person shall “be subject for the same
186
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same

180. See Vorenberg, supra note 177, at 1554 (listing reasons why “[t]he existence and
exercise of prosecutorial discretion are inconsistent with the most fundamental principles of our
system of justice and our basic notions of fair play and efficient criminal administration”).
181. State v. Krueger, 776 A.2d 720, 721 (N.H. 2001).
182. Id.
183. Krueger v. Coplan, 238 F. Supp. 2d 391, 394 n.1 (D.N.H. 2002).
184. Krueger, 776 A.2d at 722.
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. U.S. CONST. amend V. Although the Amendment by its terms applies to life and limb,
the Court has expanded the protection to apply to prison sentences and criminal fines. Jeffers v.
United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503–04
(1978) (discussing why a second prosecution may be unfairly burdensome to the defendant).
There is less explicit discussion of the double jeopardy issue in relation to the multiple counts
versus single offense issue that arises in the cases like Snow and Ebeling. See supra Part I.A.
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offense; however it is unclear whether or how double jeopardy
constrains prosecutors in defining an offense.
Fear of violating the Double Jeopardy Clause has caused many
courts to closely examine decisions concerning the units of
188
prosecution. For example, in Foley v. Commonwealth, the court
held that multiple convictions for fleeing and evading law
189
enforcement violated the prohibition on double jeopardy. The
defendant was accused of violating a statute that made it a crime for a
person to “knowingly or wantonly disobey[] a direction to stop his or
her motor vehicle, given by a person recognized to be a police
190
officer.” The defendant disobeyed orders from several police
officers while being chased and was prosecuted and convicted for two
violations of the statute, including one violation after he crossed into
191
a second county. The court “conclude[d] that fleeing or evading,
under circumstances as occurred in this case, is a single continuous
act, regardless of how many police officers may be considered to have
192
given an order to stop.” Finding that the defendant’s conduct
constituted a single crime, the court vacated the second conviction
because it constituted multiple punishments as prohibited by the
193
Double Jeopardy Clause.
Thus, when a defendant is convicted of multiple counts for an
event that should have been deemed a single criminal act, it violates
the prohibition on double jeopardy. Using the facts in Snow as an
example, if the prosecutor had charged Snow with only a single count
187. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
188. Foley v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 734 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
189. Id. at 738; see also State v. Grady, 524 S.E.2d 75, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
multiple convictions for the continuing offense of maintaining a dwelling for narcotics dealings
violated double jeopardy).
190. Foley, 233 S.W.3d at 736 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 520.095(1)(a) (West 2007)).
191. Id.
192. Id. The court applied a combination of the impulse and complete act analyses, stating:
the intent to disregard a police officer’s order to stop and then to flee or evade is
made when the initial officer gives the direction to stop. That intent does not change
simply because other officers become involved. Appellant herein failed to obey a
lawful directive of the Commonwealth. His continued disregard constituted a single
event without any sufficient break in conduct and time, and thus cannot be parsed
into separate and distinct offenses.
Id. at 737–38.
193. Id. at 738; see also People v. Batterman, 824 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(considering the same issue and deciding “that the acts of his offense carried him [through two
counties] does not allow both counties to prosecute him without violating the constitutional
prohibitions against double jeopardy”). But see State v. Mitchell, 719 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (considering the same issue and reaching the opposite conclusion).
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for the first year of cohabitation, the prosecutor, according to the
prohibition on double jeopardy, could not then charge Snow with a
second or third count for the remaining time of his cohabitation. As
194
the Supreme Court wrote in Brown v. Ohio, “[t]he Double
Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can
avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime
195
into a series of temporal or spatial units.”
III. A THREE-PART SOLUTION
Given these serious threats to the criminal justice system, this
Part presents a three-part solution to the problem of sectioning
multiple charges from a course of conduct: first, courts should apply
the rule of lenity; second, courts should evaluate the charges under
the Eighth Amendment; and third, courts should enforce a
presumption against the application of repeat offender statutes.
Although prosecutors cannot always make totally consistent charging
decisions, courts adopting these standards could provide greater
coherence and consistency in rulings and promote more just results.
At a minimum, these three approaches would compel courts to
scrutinize prosecutors’ charging decisions. And they would encourage
courts to use different analytical methods rather than relying on
standard approaches, described in Part I, that do not satisfy the
requirements of logic, clarity, and determinacy.
These suggested approaches are not meant to determine the
correct number or numbers of charges or offenses. Rather, these tests
aim to cure the symptoms—unfair, inconsistent, and cruel
punishments—that result from the immutable problem of being
unable to properly define an offense. Courts will always be left with
the four flawed tests presented in Part I; the three suggested
approaches, however, attempt to ensure that the system cannot be
abused to punish defendants multiple times for conduct which should
be considered a single crime.
A. Apply the Rule of Lenity
First, courts should adopt a consistent and strict application of
the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity provides that when courts
interpret criminal laws, “ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
194. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
195. Id. at 169.
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lenity . . . . It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to
resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the
196
imposition of a harsher punishment.” Thus, when ambiguities exist
regarding whether the legislature intended multiple punishments for
the same act or transgression, “the court should apply the rule of
lenity to presume that the legislature did not intend multiple
197
punishment.”
The rule of lenity would be helpful in these cases for three
reasons. First, the rule of lenity provides important protection for
defendants to ensure that they are not wrongly punished. The rule of
lenity does not ensure one particular interpretation over another;
rather it merely provides that when the statute is ambiguous and
there is no clear indication of what Congress intended as the unit of
prosecution, the court must choose the interpretation that is most
198
favorable toward the criminal defendant.
This interpretation
matches general criminal law principles: a person’s behavior should
not be criminalized unless the legislature clearly and precisely
199
proscribes the behavior in a criminal code. In United States v.

196. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955); see also In re Carleisha P., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d
777, 785 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Even if we were not confident in this conclusion, we would hold the
statute was at least ambiguous on this point and apply the rule of lenity in Carleisha’s favor.”).
The rule of lenity has “become the target of substantial criticism.” Note, The New Rule of
Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2420 (2006).
Observers argue that courts apply the rule inconsistently, or even randomly. Many go
further and claim that courts have stopped applying it altogether. These critics
explain the routine invocations of the rule of lenity as mere lip service: courts may
nominally acknowledge the rule, but they find statutes to be unambiguous and
therefore decline to apply it unless they would have found for the defendant on other
grounds anyway.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
197. State v. Landgraf, 913 P.2d 252, 262 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Franklin,
865 P.2d 1209, 1213 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)).
198. See Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 393–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (“The rule of lenity
entitles the accused to the lesser of two penalties where the same conduct would support either
a felony or misdemeanor conviction.” (quoting Quaweay v. State, 618 S.E.2d 707, 709 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2005))); see also United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (“In these
circumstances—where text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government’s
position is unambiguously correct—we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the
defendant’s] favor.”).
199. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345,
345–46 (“More than a simple canon of construction, this principle—known as the ‘rule of
lenity’—is considered essential to securing a variety of values of near-constitutional stature.
Narrow construction of criminal statutes, it is proclaimed, assures citizens fair notice of what the
law proscribes; it constrains the discretion of law enforcement officials; and, most
fundamentally, it embodies our legal system’s ‘instinctive distaste[] against men languishing in
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Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., the Supreme Court invoked the rule of
lenity (in concept but not explicitly in name) when determining that
the employer could not be charged with multiple violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act for the same pay practices over several
200
weeks’ time and involving multiple employees. The Court explained
that given the stakes involved, the defendant deserved the benefit of
201
the doubt. The Court found the statute was ambiguous and
explained that when choosing between “two readings of what conduct
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in
language that is clear and definite. We should not derive criminal
202
outlawry from some ambiguous implication.”
Second, the rule of lenity would limit prosecutorial discretion in
these cases. Given the ambiguity in the statutory definition of
offenses and the inevitable discretion that prosecutors must exercise,
applying the rule of lenity helps protect defendants from abuse of this
discretion. As one court said, applying the rule of lenity would
“prevent zealous prosecutors and timorous judges from perceiving
203
two offenses where the legislature intended only one.”
Third, applying the rule of lenity to the cases would provide
greater predictability and coherence in results. In Snow, for example,
the rule of lenity could have provided a principle for allowing only
204
one count for a single cohabitation.
B. Evaluate the Sentence under the Eighth Amendment
The Supreme Court has ruled that grossly excessive punishments
205
violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Although
“‘successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences
have been exceedingly rare. . . . ’ [the Court has found] that the
proportionality principle ‘would . . . come into play in the extreme
example . . . [such as] if a legislature made overtime parking a felony
prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.’” (quotation error in original) (quoting
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971))).
200. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952).
201. Id. at 218–19.
202. Id. at 221–22.
203. State v. Landgraf, 913 P.2d 252, 261 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Peter Westen &
Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 118).
204. See In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 282 (1887) (describing potentially unfair applications of
criminal laws as grounds for imposing less severe penalties).
205. For a review of these cases, see discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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206

punishable by life imprisonment.’” The Supreme Court in Ewing v.
California endorsed Justice Kennedy’s test from Harmelin v.
Michigan that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only
207
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”
Despite the narrow proportionality requirement and courts’
hesitancy to invalidate sentences, the sheer arbitrariness of many of
these cases is a perfect example of why these requirements should
208
apply. To ensure fairness, courts should vigorously apply Solem’s
three factors evaluating whether a punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment: (1) the gravity of the offense relative to the harshness of
the punishment, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for the commission
209
of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
When a defendant receives a prolonged prison sentence on the
basis of aggregated offenses, the court should consider the Eighth
Amendment’s narrow proportionality requirement. For example,
prosecutors could charge a defendant who illegally possessed a gun
for one year with fifty-two offenses. If illegal gun possession were
punishable by five years in prison, the defendant could be sentenced
to 260 years in prison. Even under the Supreme Court’s narrow
proportionality test, courts should hold that this sentence is
disproportionate. Sentencing this defendant to 260 years in prison
also would fail the three Solem factors. First, the gravity of the
offense, as measured by the societal harm caused by the mere
possession of a firearm for a one-year period, does not warrant a 260year sentence when offenses that cause far greater societal harm—
such as assaults, burglaries, and rapes—rarely if ever elicit
equivalently harsh sentences. Second, other defendants charged with
the same offense, including in other jurisdictions, do not receive
similar sentences. Third, courts do not impose similarly harsh
sentences for other, comparable crimes. Thus, by the Supreme
Court’s standards, splitting criminal conduct into several crimes could
be disproportionate to the offense and hence constitute cruel and

206. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21 (2003) (omissions in original) (quoting Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 274 n.11 (1980)).
207. Id. at 23 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).
208. See supra Part II.A.2.
209. For a discussion of Solem, see supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
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unusual punishment. Applying this standard consistently and
rigorously would provide a vital protection.
C. Employ a Presumption against Applying Repeat-Offender Statutes
Perhaps most importantly, courts should enforce a strong
presumption that if a defendant who commits an act that could be
characterized as a single continuing offense is charged with multiple
offenses, that person should not be sentenced under a recidivist
statute. Unless the legislature clearly indicates a desire to punish a
continuing act with multiple charges, multiple offenses should be
presumptively excluded from the scope of recidivist statutes. In other
words, even if a court determines that multiple charging is
appropriate, the court still must assess separately whether enhanced
sentencing as a habitual offender is appropriate. The questions are
distinct, and an affirmative answer to the first question (that multiple
charges are acceptable) should not necessarily lead to an affirmative
answer to the second question (that a sentencing enhancement for
recidivist offenders should apply). Rather, habitual-offender statutes
should be reserved for offenders who truly exhibit a repeating pattern
of criminality incapable of rehabilitation.
The instances described in this Note are ill suited for habitualoffender statutes because the two major rationales for these
statutes—deterrence and inability to be rehabilitated—do not apply
in these cases. First, the habitual offender statutes “are oriented
towards deterring convicted criminals from again committing crime,”
and deterrence does not apply to offenses such as those committed by
210
Haskell. In Haskell, the defendant was charged as a habitual
offender based on an episode of rape, occurring over a few minutes
on a single night, that was divided into four counts based on four acts
211
of penetration. A deterrence rationale entirely fails here because
the defendant committed his acts so quickly—in a matter of
minutes—he had no chance to reconsider his actions and thus be
deterred by the threat of multiple criminal charges. Furthermore, the
threat of receiving higher sentences as a recidivist was unlikely to
deter his criminal behavior because it likely never occurred to him
212
that his actions—which lasted only a few minutes —would be split
210. Note, Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 238, 238
(1948).
211. See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text.
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into four offenses. The unpredictable nature of the multiple charges,
as opposed to a single charge, likely negates any deterrence effect.
The deterrence rationale of these habitual-offender statutes in
general does not work when defendants do not have the opportunity
to reflect on or change their behavior.
The second rationale of habitual-offender laws is the failure of
previous opportunities of rehabilitation. These recidivist laws
represent a “legislative judgment . . . that offenders who have
committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit
213
felonies must be incapacitated.” Recidivist statutes are predicated
on an assumption that these offenders are those “unable to bring
[their] conduct within the social norms prescribed by the criminal law
214
of the State.” When habitual-offender statutes are applied to acts
215
that occurred in a single transaction, like in Haskell, offenders lack
the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. Nothing in Haskell’s
record would lead to the conclusion that he could not be
rehabilitated. Conduct during a single transaction cannot show the
failure of previous rehabilitation attempts or the impossibility of
future ones.
Habitual-offender laws likely were not passed with these kinds of
circumstances in mind, and yet they easily could be applied—and
indeed have been applied—in these situations. If fidelity to legislative
intent is the true test of a “fair sentence,” the combination of
recidivist statutes with the ability to charge multiple offenses for what
could be described as one crime inherently risks unfairness. Applying
the recidivist statutes to multiple counts in the circumstances this
Note describes is contrary to the legislative intent in establishing
habitual-offender statutes. Although a legislature can determine the
given sentence for a crime, “if [a state] wishes to effectively transform
its ‘three strikes and you’re out’ sentencing scheme into a ‘one strike
and you’re out’ scheme by double or triple-counting ‘same’ offenses,
it should have to state explicitly that it intends a life sentence for the
216
commission of a single particular crime.”

213.
214.
215.
216.

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003).
Id. (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980)).
See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text.
Klein, supra note 139, at 1010.
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CONCLUSION
The problem this Note addresses is one of fairness and justice.
Deciding how many charges to bring in criminal cases profoundly
affects the futures of many defendants. The lack of coherence in
charging offenses serves no one’s interest—judges are forced to write
confused opinions, prosecutors are unsure of how to charge
defendants, and defendants are often punished unfairly. This Note
presents three solutions that bring this discussion away from existing
arbitrary principles and inconsistent tests and toward greater
coherence and fairness in the law. No solution can ever perfectly
determine how courts and prosecutors should charge offenses, but the
three presented in this Note, taken together, may offer the best
opportunity for courts to achieve fairer results.

